SOC 2 risk assessment policy and register
CC3 asks whether you identify risks to your objectives and decide what to do about them. A dated register with owners and treatment decisions is the whole answer.
The risk assessment is the control most first-time companies do last and the one an auditor can dismiss fastest, because it is either a real document with owners and dates or it is a spreadsheet somebody produced the week before fieldwork. What satisfies CC3 is narrow: a stated objective, a method for identifying risks including fraud, a register that scores and ranks them, a treatment decision per risk with an owner, and evidence that management reviewed it. An afternoon and a half produces a defensible first version.
The policy behind it is short. It names who runs the assessment, how often, what scale is used, who approves the results, and what triggers an off-cycle reassessment. Two pages at most. The register is the artifact.
15 to 25 Risks in a first register for a company of 10 to 100 people
How do you actually run the assessment?
- Write the objective in one sentence. For SOC 2 it is usually the security, availability and confidentiality of the customer data your product holds. Every risk below is a risk to that.
- Get three or four people in a room for two hours: whoever owns infrastructure, whoever owns the product, whoever owns the company. Not a consultant working alone, because the value is in the argument.
- List risks by walking your own system: how data gets in, where it rests, who can reach it, what you depend on, who leaves. Add the fraud category explicitly, since CC3 asks about fraud risk and most registers skip it.
- Score each on likelihood and impact using a 1 to 5 scale you define in the policy. Multiply for an inherent score. Do not build anything more elaborate.
- Name the existing controls, then score the residual risk. The gap between inherent and residual is what makes the register readable.
- Decide treatment for each: mitigate with a named action and a date, accept with a named person accepting it, transfer to insurance or a contract, or avoid by not doing the thing.
- Have management review and approve it in a meeting with minutes. The approval record is what CC3 evidence usually rests on.
A worked register extract
Scores below are likelihood times impact on a 1 to 5 scale, so 25 is the maximum. These are the rows that turn up in almost every Canadian SaaS company's first register, written the way they should read.
| Risk | L | I | Inherent | Existing control | Residual | Treatment and owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Credential compromise of an engineer with production access | 3 | 5 | 15 | Single sign-on with enforced multi-factor authentication, hardware keys for admins | 5 | Mitigate. Extend hardware keys to all engineers by Q2. Head of engineering |
| Accidental deletion or corruption of the production database | 2 | 5 | 10 | Point-in-time recovery, 35 day retention, restore tested annually | 4 | Mitigate. Add a second restore test mid-year. Platform lead |
| Customer data exposed by an application flaw | 3 | 5 | 15 | Peer review, dependency scanning, annual penetration test | 8 | Mitigate. Add authorization test coverage on tenant boundaries. Head of engineering |
| Critical vendor outage lasting more than a day | 2 | 4 | 8 | Vendor register, reports reviewed annually, status monitoring | 6 | Accept. Failover is not economic at current scale. Signed by the CTO |
| Key person leaves and undocumented systems knowledge goes with them | 3 | 3 | 9 | Runbooks for on-call, shared access to all accounts | 6 | Mitigate. Runbook coverage review each quarter. Platform lead |
| Fraudulent payment or expense processed by a single person | 2 | 3 | 6 | Dual approval above a threshold, monthly reconciliation | 3 | Accept. Reviewed at each management meeting. Finance owner |
| Personal information transferred to a processor without a data protection agreement | 3 | 4 | 12 | Vendor onboarding requires signed terms before data flows | 4 | Mitigate. Back-fill agreements for four legacy vendors by Q3. Operations lead |
Two things make this extract read as real rather than generated. The residual scores are not all comfortable, and one row is accepted with a named accepter rather than mitigated. A register where every risk is mitigated to a low score is a register nobody believed while writing it. The vendor management policy is where the last two rows get their controls, and the continuity plan owns the second.
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What cadence and what triggers a reassessment?
Annually is the right commitment for a company under a hundred people, with management review of the register at a shorter interval, usually quarterly, so that treatment actions get chased. Writing quarterly full assessments into the policy is a mistake: four thorough reassessments a year produces three shallow ones and an exception.
Name the off-cycle triggers explicitly. That is what turns the policy from a calendar entry into a live control. A material change in the product, a significant security incident, entering a new market or regulated data type, a new critical vendor, or an acquisition. Write those five and you have a policy that responds to events rather than only to dates.
The register and the treatment tracker are one document
Companies often produce a beautiful risk assessment in January and never touch the mitigation column again. An auditor reading a Q4 register with seven actions all dated Q2 has found a control that stopped operating. Track the actions where you track everything else, and put the closure dates back into the register at each management review.
What gets a risk assessment turned into a finding?
No date and no approver. A register with no assessment date, no attendee list and no evidence that management saw it is not an assessment. This is the single most common defect, and it is fixed by an agenda item and a set of minutes.
Generic risks nobody could act on. "Cyber attack", "data breach", "non-compliance" appear in every downloaded template. They are categories, not risks, and they produce no treatment decision. A risk statement should name a thing that could happen to a system you actually run.
No fraud consideration. CC3 asks about the potential for fraud in assessing risks to objectives. Most first registers are purely technical and skip it entirely, which is an easy question for an auditor to ask and an awkward one to answer. One or two rows covering payment fraud, expense abuse or insider misuse of customer data closes it.
Risks accepted with nobody accepting them. Acceptance is a legitimate treatment and it is often the right one. What fails is an accepted risk with a blank owner column, because acceptance is an act by a person with authority to accept it. Write the name.
A register disconnected from the gap analysis. If your gap analysis found six missing controls and none of them appear as risks, the two documents are describing different companies. An auditor who reads both will notice. Reconcile them once, and use the policy checklist to confirm whether risk content should sit in its own document or inside your information security policy. The policy templates page covers editing the inherited version down to something you will keep.
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Get matchedCommon questions
Does SOC 2 require a specific risk methodology?
No. There is no required scale, matrix or framework. What the criteria ask is that you have a process, that it considers changes and fraud, and that it produces decisions. A five by five matrix defined in your own policy is entirely acceptable, and simpler is better when you have to explain it in an interview.
How is this different from the ISO 27001 risk assessment?
ISO 27001 is more prescriptive: it expects a defined methodology, risk owners, a statement of applicability and a formal risk treatment plan. The underlying register can be the same one. If ISO is on your roadmap, build the register with risk owners and treatment plans from the start and you will not redo it.
Who should own the risk register?
One named person who can convene the assessment and chase treatment actions, usually whoever owns the security program. Ownership of individual risks belongs with the people who can actually change the outcome, which is why every row in the worked example names an engineering or operations lead rather than the register owner.
Do we need a separate vendor risk assessment?
Not as a separate exercise. Vendor risk is one category inside the same register, with the per-vendor detail living in the vendor register. Splitting them into two independent assessments creates two documents that drift and two review cadences to miss.
Should privacy risks be in the same register?
Yes for a Canadian company, because the obligations are real and the same people would have to assess them anyway. Rows about cross-border transfer, retention beyond need, and processors without data protection terms sit naturally next to the technical risks and give you most of what a privacy impact assessment would ask for later.